SUMMARY Proofs written in algebraic specification languages are called proof scores. The proof score approach to design verification is attractive because it provides a flexible way to prove that designs for systems satisfy properties. Thus far, however, the approach has focused on safety properties. In this paper, we describe a way to verify that designs for systems satisfy liveness properties with the approach. A mutual exclusion protocol using a queue is used as an example. We describe the design verification and explain how it is verified that the protocol satisfies the lockout freedom property.
Introduction
The proof score approach to design verification is a formal method of verifying that a design for a system satisfies a property. In the approach, a design for a system is specified in an algebraic specification language, a property is expressed in the language, and it is verified that the design satisfies the property by writing proofs (or proof plans) called proof scores in the language and executing the proof scores with a processor of the language.
We have argued in [2] that the the approach has several attractive characteristics thanks to (1) balanced humancomputer interaction and (2) flexible but clear structure of proof scores. The former means that humans are able to focus on proof plans, while tedious and detailed computations can be left to computers; humans do not necessarily have to know what deductive rules or equations should be applied to goals to prove. The latter means that lemmas do not need to be proved in advance and proof scores can help humans comprehend the corresponding proofs; a proof that a system satisfies a property can be conducted even when all lemmas used have not been proved, and assumptions used are explicitly and clearly written in proof scores.
The OTS/CafeOBJ method [3] - [5] is an instance of the proof score approach to design verification. The main ingredients of the OTS/CafeOBJ method are observational transition systems (OTSs) and CafeOBJ. OTSs are a kind of transition system (or state machine), which can be used as mathematical models of designs for systems, and CafeManuscript received May 11, 2007 . Manuscript revised August 1, 2008 . † The authors are with the School of Information Science, JAIST, Nomi-shi, 923-1292 Japan.
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OBJ [6] is an executable algebraic specification language and system. Given a problem that a design for a system satisfies a property, in the OTS/CafeOBJ method, (1) the design is modeled as an OTS, which is written in CafeOBJ, (2) the property is expressed as a CafeOBJ term, and (3) it is verified that the OTS satisfies the property by writing proof scores in CafeOBJ and executing them with CafeOBJ. A survey of proof scores in CafeOBJ is described in [7] .
We have conducted case studies [8] - [10] to demonstrate the usefulness of the OTS/CafeOBJ method. Thus far, however, the OTS/CafeOBJ method has mainly focused on invariant properties, which are safety properties. This paper shows that the method can also deal with other kinds of properties, especially ensures and leads-to properties, which are liveness properties. A mutual exclusion protocol using a queue, which is called Qlock [5] , is used as an example; it is verified that Qlock satisfies the lockout (or starvation) freedom property, which can be expressed as a leads-to property.
The OTS/CafeOBJ method has been largely influenced by UNITY [11] . Although UNITY has been widely used to design parallel and distributed systems, UNITY itself does not provide any tool support. Therefore, some formal methods and tools have been used to support UNITY [12] - [14] , The OTS/CafeOBJ method may be regarded as one of such formal methods and tools. None of the existing formal methods and tools to support UNITY is based on the proof score approach to design verification. This is the essential difference between the OTS/CafeOBJ method and the others.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes OTSs including the five basic properties. Section 3 introduces CafeOBJ. Section 4 describes proof scores of ensures and leads-to properties. Section 5 reports on a case study in which it is verified that Qlock satisfies the lockout freedom property. Section 6 mentions some related work. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Observational Transition Systems (OTSs)
We describe the definitions of basic concepts on observational transition systems, or OTSs, and five basic properties with respect to (wrt) OTSs.
Definitions
We suppose that there exists a universal state space denoted If an observer (a transition) does not have any indexes, the observer (the transition) itself is the instance of the observer (the transition).
Given an OTS S and two states υ, υ ∈ Υ, if there exists an instance t b 1 ,...,b n of a transition t ∈ T such that t b 1 ,...,b n (υ) = S υ , we write υ queue is the queue of process IDs shared by all processes. put, top and get are the usual functions of queues. put(queue, i) puts a process ID i into queue at the end, get(queue) deletes the top element from queue if queue is not empty, and top(queue) returns the top element of queue if queue is not empty. rs, wt and cs are labels given to the pseudo-code, standing for the remainder section, waiting and the critical section. Initially, each process i is at label rs and queue is empty. Let Label, Pid and Queue be the types of labels, process IDs and queues of process IDs, respectively.
Qlock can be modeled as the OTS S Qlock such that
where empty is the empty queue. The three transitions are defined as follows:
where put, top and get are the same functions appearing in the pseudo-code.
Definition 2 (Reachable states): Given an OTS S, reachable states wrt S are inductively defined:
• Each υ ∈ I is reachable wrt S.
• For each υ, υ ∈ Υ such that υ S υ , if υ is reachable wrt S, so is υ .
Let R S be the set of all reachable states wrt S.
Example 2 (Reachable states wrt S Qlock ): Let υ 0 ∈ I Qlock . Both want i (υ 0 ) and try i (want i (υ 0 )) are reachable wrt S Qlock . υ −1 such that pc i (υ −1 ) = cs ∧ pc j (υ −1 ) = cs ∧ i j is not reachable wrt S Qlock , although it needs to be verified.
Properties
Predicates whose types are Υ → Bool are called state predicates. We suppose that every state predicate considered in this paper does not have any quantifiers unless otherwise explicitly stated. Note that variables freely occurring in formulas are equivalent to universally quantified variables. There are five basic properties wrt S, which are inspired by UNITY [11] .
Definition 3 (Five Basic Properies): Let p, q, r, p j be arbitrary state predicates, and J be an arbitrary set. Given an OTS S, the five properties are defined:
holds if and only if this can be deduced by applying the three deductive rules finitely often:
Note that invariant S q can also be defined as ∀υ : Before describing what the remaining two properties say, we define executions of an OTS S. An arbitrary infinite sequence υ 0 , υ 1 , . . . of states satisfying the following three conditions is called an execution of S:
• Initiation : υ 0 ∈ I.
• Consecution : For each i ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, υ i S υ i+1 .
• The role of Fairness is to make it possible to interpret p ensures S q as described in the previous paragraph. If we do not assume Fairness, p ensures S q does not necessarily mean that whenever S reaches a state where p holds, S will eventually reach a state where q holds because some transitions may be never applied from some time on. When ensures and leads-to properties are verified, we do not need to explicitly care about Fairness because the definitions of ensures and leads-to properties do not refer to Fairness.
Some readers may wonder if the three deductive rules for leads-to properties are sound and complete. Let LT(p, q) be the property that whenever S reaches a state where p holds, S will eventually reach a state where q holds. Whenever p → S q is deduced by applying the rules finitely often, the rules are called sound if LT(p, q) holds. Whenever LT(p, q) holds, the rules are called complete if p → S q is deduced by applying the rules finitely often. When we argue the soundness, all we have to do is to check if each rule is sound. The first rule is sound because p ensures S q can be interpreted as LT(p, q) as described above. Since it is natural that LT is transitive, namely that LT(p, r) comes from LT(p, q) and LT(q, r), the second rule is sound. It is also natural that if LT(p j , q) holds for all j ∈ J, then LT((∃ j : J. p i ), q) holds because ∃ j : J. p i implies that some p k holds. Therefore, the third rule is sound. For the completeness, we refer to the article [15] .
Example 3 (Properties of S Qlock ): Let p(υ, i), q(υ, i)
and r(υ, i) be pc i (υ) = cs, pc i (υ) = wt and top(queue(υ)) = i, respectively. Some properties of S Qlock are as follows:
The third property is called the mutual exclusion property and the fifth property is called the lockout (or starvation) freedom property. The five properties need to be verified. We will describe the verification of the fifth property in this paper. The verification needs eight invariant properties, three ensures properties and four leads-to properties as lemmas. Among the lemmas are the third and fourth properties.
CafeOBJ
CafeOBJ [6] is an algebraic specification language and system mainly based on order-sorted algebras and hidden algebras [16] , [17] . Data types are specified in terms of ordersorted algebras, and state machines such as OTSs are specified in terms of hidden algebras. Algebraic specifications of state machines are called behavioral specifications. There are two kinds of sorts in CafeOBJ: visible sorts and hidden sorts. A visible sort denotes a data type, while a hidden sort denotes the state space of a state machine. There are three kinds of operators (or operations) wrt hidden sorts: hidden constants, action operators and observation operators. Hidden constants denote initial states of state machines, action operators denote state transitions of state machines, and observation operators let us know the situation where state machines are located. Both an action operator and an observation operator take a state of a state machine and zero or more data. The action operator returns the successor state of the state wrt the state transition denoted by the action operator plus the data. The observation operator returns a value that characterizes the situation where the state machine is located.
Basic units of CafeOBJ specifications are modules. CafeOBJ provides built-in modules. One of the most important built-in modules is BOOL in which propositional logic is specified. BOOL is automatically imported by almost every module unless otherwise stated. In BOOL and its parent modules, declared are the visible sort Bool, the constants true and false of Bool, and operators denoting some basic logical connectives. Among the operators are not_, _and_, _or_, _xor_, _implies_ and _iff_ denoting negation (¬), conjunction (∧), disjunction (∨), exclusive disjunction (xor), implication (⇒) and logical equivalence (⇔), respectively. An underscore _ indicates the place where an argument is put such as a and b. The operator if_then_else_fi corresponding to the if construct in programming languages is also declared. CafeOBJ uses the Hsiang term rewriting system [18] as the decision procedure for propositional logic, which is implemented in BOOL. CafeOBJ reduces any term denoting a proposition that is always true (false) to true (false). More generally, a term denoting a proposition reduces to an exclusively disjunctive normal form of the proposition.
In the rest of this section, we describe how to specify data types and OTSs, and how to prove that data types satisfy properties by giving some examples, which will be used later.
Specification in CafeOBJ
We first specify Label, Pid, Nat (that is the type of natural numbers) and Queues. Label is specified in the module LABEL:
ops rs wt cs : -> Label op _=_ : Label Label -> Bool {comm} var L : Label eq (L = L) = true . eq (rs = wt) = false . eq (rs = cs) = false . eq (wt = cs) = false . }
The keyword mod! indicates that the module is a tight semantics declaration, meaning the smallest model (implementation) that respect all requirements written in the module. Visible sorts are declared by enclosing them with [ and ] . Label is the visible sort of labels. The keyword op is used to declare (non-observation and action) operators, and ops to declare more than one such operator simultaneously. The operator _=_ checks if two labels are equal. The keyword comm specifies that the operator _=_ is commutative, namely that l1 = l2 equals l2 = l1. The keyword var is used to declare variables, and vars to declare more than one variable simultaneously. L is a variable of Label. The keyword eq is used to declare equations, and ceq to declare conditional equations in which conditions are written after the keyword if. Equations and conditional equations are used to define operators and specify properties of operators. CafeOBJ uses declared equations as left-to-right rewrite rules to reduce terms.
Pid is specified in the module PID:
op _=_ : Pid Pid -> Bool {comm} var I : Pid eq (I = I) = true . }
The keyword mod* indicates that the module is a loose semantics declaration, meaning an arbitrary model (implementation) that respects all requirements written in the module.
Nat is specified in the module PNAT:
mod! PNAT { [Nat] op 0 : -> Nat op s : Nat -> Nat op _<_ : Nat Nat -> Bool op _=_ : Nat Nat -> Bool {comm} vars X Y : Nat eq 0 < 0 = false . eq 0 < s(X) = true . eq s(X) < s(Y) = X < Y . eq (X = X) = true . eq (s(X) = 0) = false .
eq (s(X) = s(Y)) = (X = Y) . }
The constant 0 denotes zero and the operator s is the successor function of natural numbers. The operator _<_ is the less-than predicate of natural numbers.
We first specify generic queues in the module QUEUE: The keyword pr is used to import modules. QUEUE imports PNAT. The constant empty denotes the empty queue and the operator _,_ is the constructor of non-empty queues. The operators put, get and top are usual functions of queues, and the operator _\in_ is the membership predicate of queues. The operator del deletes a given element from a given queue if any. The operator where returns the nearest position from top where a given element appears in a given queue if any.
QUEUE has one formal parameter D. Given a module that respects all the requirements in the module EQTRIV as an actual parameter, QUEUE is instantiated. EQTRIV is as follows:
op _=_ : Elt Elt -> Bool {comm} var X : Elt eq (X = X) = true . } When QUEUE is instantiated with an actual parameter M, visible sort Elt.D is replaced with the visible sort in M corresponding to the visible sort Elt in EQTRIV. For example, QUEUE(PID) is the module obtained by instantiating QUEUE with PID, specifying Queue. Now that we have specified the data types used in S Qlock , we next specify S Qlock in the module QLOCK: and ]*. Sys is the hidden sort denoting Υ. The keyword bop is used to declare observation and action operators, and bops to declare more than one such operator simultaneously. The hidden constant init denotes an arbitrary initial state and the two observation and three action operators correspond to the two observers and three transitions of S Qlock , respectively. The operator c-want, c-try and c-exit denote the effective conditions c-want, c-try and c-exit, respectively. The module has the four sets of equations that define init, want, try and exit.
Verification with CafeOBJ
In this paper, we will discuss the verification that Qlock satisfies the lockout freedom property. The verification needs two lemmas on natural numbers and 10 lemmas on queues (see Appendix A). We describe the proofs of two of the 12 lemmas. The two lemmas are as follows:
eq nat-lemma2(X) = not(X = s(X)) . 
x) . close
The command open makes a temporary module that imports a given module and the command close destroys such a temporary module. The constants x and y denote arbitrary natural numbers. The term nat-lemma2(y) is the induction hypothesis. Such a proof written in CafeOBJ is called a proof score. Fragments enclosed with open and close in proof scores are called proof passages. The above proof score consists of two proof passages.
The two proof passages are of the base case and the induction case, respectively. What to prove in the base case is nat-lemma2(0), and what to prove in the induction case is nat-lemma2(s(y)) under the induction hypothesis nat-lemma2(y), where y denotes an arbitrary natural number. The proofs can be conducted by having CafeOBJ execute the proof passages. When CafeOBJ returns true for both the proof passages, the proofs are successful. CafeOBJ indeed returns true for the proof passages.
If CafeOBJ does not return true for some proof passage, you need to split the corresponding case into multiple sub-cases and/or to use some appropriate lemmas [3] . Note that although proof scores could be generated automatically [19] , [20] , human users basically need to write proof scores in the OTS/CafeOBJ method, which implies that human users are responsible for checking if all cases are covered.
The proof score of the second lemma is as follows:
open QUEUE op q : -> Queue . ops x y : -> Elt.D . e= empty . 
y) . close
The first proof passage is of the base case, and the second and third proof passages are of the induction case. The induction case is split into the two sub-cases based on the proposition x = z. In the sub-case corresponding to the second proof passage, the proposition holds. In the subcase corresponding to the third proof passage, the proposition does not. queue-lemma3(q',x,y) is the induction hypothesis (precisely an instance of the induction hypothesis), which is used in the second sub-case (i.e. the third proof passage). CafeOBJ returns true for each of the three proof passages, which means that the second lemma is successfully proved.
Proof scores of invariant properties [3] - [5] are very similar to ones of lemmas (and theorems) on data types.
Proof Scores of Liveness Properties
We have described in [3] - [5] how to verify that an OTS S satisfies invariant properties based on proof scores. In this section, we describe how to verify that S satisfies ensures and leads-to properties based on proof scores. Proofs of ensures properties consist of ones of unless properties and stable properties are specialized unless properties. Therefore, proof scores described in this section also covers unless and stable properties. We suppose that S is specified in a module SYSTEM in which a hidden sort H is declared and invariant properties wrt S are written in a module INV.
Proof Scores of ensures Properties
The proof of p ensures S q consists of those of p unless S q and p eventually S q. The former is called the unless case, and the latter the eventually case. We suppose that in addition to υ whose type is R S , p and q have the free variables z 1 , . . . , z α whose types are D 1 , . . . , D α .
We first describe the unless case. We declare the operators denoting p and q, and their defining equations in a module UNL (which imports SYSTEM and INV) as follows:
are CafeOBJ terms denoting p and q. We also declare a constant z k denoting an arbitrary value of V k for k = 1, . . . , α in UNL. Let − → z α be an abbreviation of
The basic formula to prove in the unless case is denoted by the operator, which is declared and defined in a module USTEP (which imports UNL) as follows: open USTEP --arbitrary objects op y 1 : -> V t1 . · · · op y n : -> V tn .
--assumptions Declarations of equations denoting case l .
--successor state eq s' = t(s, − → y n ) .
--check red Lems implies ustep( − → z α ) .
close Each V tk is a visible sort corresponding to D tk for k = 1, . . . , n. Each constant y k denotes an arbitrary value of V tk for k = 1, . . . , n. − → y n is an abbreviation of y 1 ,...,y n .
A set of equations is used to denote case l . We may declare other constants (which denote arbitrary values) used in equations denoting case l . The constant s' is defined as t(s, − → y n ), which denotes an arbitrary t-successor state of s wrt S.
Lems is a CafeOBJ term, which can be constructed by combining instances of invariant properties wrt S and/or lemmas on data types with conjunctions. Lems is used to exclude unreachable states from cases to consider. "Lems implies" may be omitted.
The variables z 1 , . . . , z α occur freely in p and q. Free variables are equivalent to universally quantified ones. Therefore, if some instance of unl p (s, − → Z α ) and not(unl q (s, − → Z α )) reduces to false in the proof passage of the sub-case case l , the proof of the sub-case is discharged. Hence, Lems may include such an instance.
When CafeOBJ returns true for the proof passage of each sub-case l, the proof of the unless case is successfully completed.
We next describe the eventually case. The basic formula to prove in the eventually case is denoted by the operator, which is declared and defined in a module ESTEP (which imports UNL) as follows:
All needed is to prove that there exists a witness, namely an instance of a transition that makes estep( − → z α ) 
We may declare constants used in equations denoting case l . As the unless case, Lem may contain an instance of unl p (s, − → Z α ) and not(unl q (s, − → Z α )). When CafeOBJ returns true for the proof passage of each sub-case l, the proof of the eventually case is successfully completed.
Proof Scores of leads-to Properties
Rewriting is used to verify that S satisfies leads-to properties based on deductive rules of leads-to. To this end, deductive rules of leads-to are written in terms of equations. When such deductive rules are written, however, we do not use the logical operators such as _and_ and _or_ declared and defined in the module BOOL and its parent modules. Basically, the left-hand side of an equation should be in normal (irreducible) form so that CafeOBJ can use the equation effectively as a rewrite rule. The normal form of a term such as p or q made of the logical operators is an exclusively disjunctive normal form such as (q and p) xor q xor p. Exclusive disjunctive normal forms are hard to read. It is inconvenient to use such hard-to-read terms as the left-hand sides of equations.
Therefore, we declare new operators denoting basic logical connectives in a module OTSLOGIC as follows: The operators denote negation (¬), conjunction (∧), disjunction (∨), implication (⇒) and logical equivalence (⇔), respectively. As comm, assoc, r-assoc and prec: are attributes given to operators. assoc specifies that an operator _@_ is associative, namely that (a @ b) @ c equals a @ (b @ c), r-assoc specifies that an operator _@_ is right associative, namely that a @ b @ c is parsed as a @ (b @ c), and prec: specifies the precedence of an operator. A natural number is written after prec:. The greater the number, the weaker the precedence. OTSLOGIC has an operator eval to evaluate terms made of these operators. The operator is declared and defined as follows:
op eval : Bool -> Bool eq eval(true) = true . eq eval(false) = false . eq eval(˜P)
= not eval(P) . eq eval(P /\ Q) = eval(P) and eval(Q) . eq eval(P \/ Q) = eval(P) or eval(Q) . eq eval(P => Q) = eval(P) implies eval(Q) . eq eval(P <=> Q) = eval(P) iff eval(Q) .
where P and Q are CafeOBJ variables of Bool. The variables are also used in the rest of this subsection. In addition, let P1, Q1, R, R1 and R2 be CafeOBJ variables of Bool.
We use invariant, ensures and leads-to properties to reason about leads-to properties. Therefore, we declare the operators denoting these three kinds of properties in OTSLOGIC as follows:
The remainder of OTSLOGIC are equations denoting conditional deductive rules of leads-to properties. We use three kinds of conditional deductive rules of leads-to properties, which are as follows:
The three rules are parameterized. R S , R1 S and R2 S are parameters. The three rules can be instantiated by replacing each of R S , R1 S and R2 S with ⇒, ensures S and → S . Therefore, we have 21 conditional deductive rules of leadsto properties. A conditional deductive rule can be applied provided that the condition holds. We straightforwardly prove that if p ⇒ q, then p → S q for an arbitrary OTS S. This fact and the three deductive rules of leads-to properties in Definition 3 are used to prove that the 21 conditional deductive rules are valid.
Each of the 21 rules is denoted by one conditional equation. In this paper, the three equations denoting three of the 21 rules are shown: ceq ((P1 ensures Q1) => (P |--> Q)) = true if eval(P => P1) and eval(Q1 => Q) .
=> (P |--> Q)) = true if eval(P => P1) and eval(R => R1) and eval(Q1 => Q) .
ceq ((P1 |--> R1 /\ Q1 |--> R2) => (P |--> R)) = true if eval(P => (P1 \/ Q1)) and eval(R1 <=> R2) and eval(R1 => R) .
In addition to the 21 conditional equations denoting the 21 rules, one more conditional equation denoting a deductive rule of leads-to properties is declared in OTSLOGIC:
ceq (P |--> Q) = true if eval(P => Q) .
The deductive rule denoted by the conditional equation expresses the fact that if p ⇒ q, then p → S q for an arbitrary OTS S.
We use one more conditional deductive rule of leads-to properties. The rule is as follows:
where m is an arbitrary value in an arbitrary set W, M is an arbitrary function mapping Υ to W, and ≺ is an arbitrary well-founded relation on W. The definition of leads-to S and the mathematical induction principle are used to prove that the rule is valid [11] .
Since the rule has W as its parameter, the conditional equation denoting the rule is declared in a parameterized module INDOFLTO, which imports OTSLOGIC. An actual parameter of the module has to satisfy the requirements declared in a module EQLTRIV, which is as follows: When INDOFLTO is instantiated with a module M that satisfies EQLTRIV, Elt.D, _=_ and _<_ are replaced with the corresponding sort, the corresponding operator and the corresponding operator in M.
In order to reason about leads-to properties from equations denoting deductive rules of leads-to properties, we declare and define in a module PROVED (which imports SYSTEM and OTSLOGIC) operators denoting invariant and ensures properties. Such invariant and ensures properties need to be proved in order to complete proving leads-to properties. It is not quite necessary, however, to finish proving such invariant and ensures properties in order to start proving leads-to properties. Operators denoting such invariant and ensures properties are defined with invariant_, _ensures_,˜_, _/\_, _\/_, _=>_ and _<=>_ declared in OTSLOGIC. We declare and define in a module LTO (which imports PROVED) operators denoting leads-to properties to prove. Such operators are defined with _|-->_,˜_, _/\_, _\/_, _=>_ and _<=>_ declared in OTSLOGIC.
Let us consider proving p → S q. We suppose that in addition to υ whose type is R S , p and q have the free variables z 1 , . . . , z α whose types are D 1 , . . . , D α as we did in the previous subsection. We also use the same abbreviations used in the previous subsection. We declare the operator denoting p → S q and its defining equation in LTO:
As proof scores of ensures properties, we often need case splitting and lemmas. We suppose that the case is split into L sub-cases characterized by L propositions case 1 close "pr(INDOFLTO(M))" may be omitted. Prem is a CafeOBJ term whose form is P or P /\ Q, where P is a CafeOBJ term denoting an invariant property, an ensures property or a leads-to property, and so is Q. "Prem =>" may be omitted.
Verification that Qlock Satisfies the Lockout Freedom Property
We describe verification that S Qlock satisfies the lockout freedom property, namely that (pc i (υ) = wt) → (pc i (υ) = cs). The property is denoted by the operator lto16, which is defined in a module LTO as follows:
eq lto16(S,I) = ((pc(S,I) = wt) |--> (pc(S,I) = cs)) .
where S and I are CafeOBJ variables of Sys and Pid. As described in Example 3, the verification needs eight invariant properties (see Appendix B), three ensures properties and four leads-to properties. Three of the eight invariant properties are directly needed for the verification. The remaining five are needed to verify the three invariant properties and the three ensures properties. Moreover, the verification needs two lemmas on natural numbers and 10 lemmas on queues as mentioned in Sect. 3.2.
The three invariant properties and the three ensures properties are denoted by the operators inv6, inv7, inv8, ens9, ens10 and ens11, which are defined in a module PROVED (which imports QLOCK and OTSLOGIC) as shown in Fig. 1 . The four leads-to properties are denoted by the operators lto12, lto13, lto14 and lto15, which are defined in the module LTO (which imports PROVED) as shown in Fig. 2 . In Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 , S, I, J and N are CafeOBJ variables of Sys, Pid, Pid and Nat, respectively. The constants s, i and n of Sys, Pid and Nat are declared in LTO.
The leads-to property denoted by lto16 is deduced from the invariant property denoted by inv8 and the leadsto property denoted by lto17. The corresponding proof score is as follows: 
i) . close
CafeOBJ returns true for this proof score.
In the rest of the section, we describe the proof scores of the two leads-to properties denoted by lto14 and lto15, and that of the ensures property denoted by ens11. The proof scores of lto12 and lto13 are written in the same way as that of lto16, and the proof scores of ens9 and ens10 are written in the same way as that of ens11.
Proof Score of lto14
The leads-to property denoted by lto14 is deduced from the two invariant properties denoted by inv7 and inv8, the ensures property denoted by ens9 and the leads-to property denoted by lto13. The verification also needs the lemma nat-lemma2 on natural numbers. The case is split into four sub-cases. The four sets of equations for the four sub-cases are as follows: 
n) . close
CafeOBJ returns true for each of the four proof passages.
Proof Score of lto15
The leads-to property denoted by lto15 is deduced from the leads-to property denoted by lto14. The proof score is as follows:
i) . close
Proof Score of ens11
The two state predicates in the ensures property denoted by ens11 are denoted by the operators unl11-1 and unl11-2, which are defined in a module UNL (which imports QLOCK and INV) as follows: S, I, J and N are CafeOBJ variables of Sys, Pid, Pid and Nat, respectively. The constants i, j and n of Pid, Pid and Nat are declared in UNL.
The basic formula to prove in the eventually case is denoted by the operator estep11, which is defined in a module ESTEP (which imports UNL) as follows: eq estep11(I,J,N) = (unl11-1(s,I,J,N) and not unl11-2(s,I,J,N)) implies unl11-2(s',I,J,N) .
The basic formula to prove in the unless case is denoted by the operator ustep11, which is defined in a module USTEP (which imports UNL) as follows: eq ustep11(I,J,N) = (unl11-1(s,I,J,N) and not unl11-2(s,I,J,N)) implies (unl11-1(s',I,J,N) or unl11-2(s',I,J,N)) .
In the eventually case, all needed is to prove that there exists a witness, namely an instance of a transition, that makes estep11(i,j,m) true. We conjecture that try j is such a witness, which is confirmed by writing a proof score. To this end, the case is split into five sub-cases. The five sets of equations for the five sub-cases are as follows:
1. queue(s) = empty 2. queue(s) = k,q, (k = j) = false 3. queue(s) = k,q, k = j, i = j 4. queue(s) = k,q, k = j, (i = j) = false, (pc(s,j) = wt) = false 5. queue(s) = k,q, k = j, (i = j) = false, pc(s,j) = wt where k is a constant (of Pid) denoting an arbitrary process ID and q is a constant (of Queue) denoting an arbitrary queue. The term k,q denotes an arbitrary non-empty queue. The proof scores of the fifth sub-case is shown:
open ESTEP op k : -> Pid . op q : -> Queue . eq queue(s) = k,q . eq k = j . eq (i = j) = false . eq pc(s,j) = wt . eq s' = try(s,j) . red estep11(i,j,n) . close CafeOBJ returns true for the proof passage. The proof scores of the remaining four sub-cases are written likewise.
In the unless case, all we have to do is to prove istep11(i,j,n) for each instance of every transition (every action operator). We describe the proof that an arbitrary instance want k of the transition want makes istep11(i,j,n) true. For the proof, the case is split into five sub-cases. The five sets of equations for the five subcases are as follows:
where l is a constant (of Pid) denoting an arbitrary process ID and q is a constant (of Queue) denoting an arbitrary queue. Note that the equation pc(s,k) = cs is equivalent to the equation c-exit(s,k) = true.
The proof of the fourth sub-case needs an invariant property wrt S Qlock and those of the remaining sub-cases do not need any invariant properties and any lemmas on data types. The invariant property needed for the proof of the fourth sub-case is denoted by the operator inv2, which is defined in the module INV as follows: eq inv2(S,I) = (pc(S,I) = cs implies top(queue(S)) = I) .
The proof score of the fourth sub-cases is shown:
open USTEP op k : -> Pid . op l : -> Pid . op q : -> Queue . eq pc(s,k) = cs . eq (i = k) = false . eq queue(s) = l,q . eq (l = k) = false . eq s' = exit(s,k) . red inv2(s,k) implies ustep11(i,j,n) . close CafeOBJ returns true for the proof passage.
The proof passages of the remaining four sub-cases are written likewise. The proof passages that arbitrary instances of the remaining transitions want and try make istep11(i,j,n) true are also written likewise, which need the three lemmas (queue-lemma3, queue-lemma8 and queue-lemma9; see Appendix A) on queues.
Related Work
Many methodologies have been proposed to verify that systems and/or programs satisfy liveness as well as safety properties. Among such methodologies are UNITY [11] , IOA [21] and TLA [22] . Moreover, many formal tools have been developed, which can be used to formalize (or mechanize) such methodologies. Among such tools are CafeOBJ [6] , Larch [23] , Isabelle [24] , Coq [25] and HOL [26] . IOA has been formalized in Larch [27] , TLA has been formalized in Larch and HOL [28] , [29] , and UNITY has been formalized in Isabelle, Coq and HOL [12] - [14] . The OTS/CafeOBJ method has been largely influenced by UNITY and may be regarded as a method of supporting formal verification of UNITY programs modeled as OTSs. Therefore, we summarize one approach to formalizing UNITY.
Paulson [12] proposes a way to formalize (or mechanize) UNITY in Isabelle [24] , which is a proof assistant based on higher-order logic. The UNITY he uses is new UNITY [30] , [31] , while the UNITY that affects the OTS/CafeOBJ method is classic UNITY [11] . The most primitive property (or temporal operator) is unless in classic UNITY, while it is co (or next) in new UNITY. Given two state predicates p and q, p co q is defined as follows: whenever p holds in a state of a UNITY program, every statement of the program makes q hold in the successor state. unless can be defined in terms of co, namely (p ∧ ¬q) co (p ∨ q), which is equal to p unless q. Paulson formalizes the six basic properties (co, stable, invariant, transient, ensures and leads-to) in Isabelle and reason about theorems on safety and liveness properties with Isabelle. Given a state predicate p, transient p is defined as follows: whenever p holds in a state of a UNITY program, there exists a statement of the program that makes p false in the successor state. He also defines the weak version of the six basic properties so that the basic properties satisfy the substitution axiom [32] . The weak version takes into account reachable states of programs. The definition of the five basic properties in this paper correspond to the weak version.
Recently much attention has been paid to model checking [33] because it can verify fully automatically that systems and/or programs satisfy safety and liveness properties. Many model checkers have been developed. Basically, however, systems that can be model checked should be finite state. On the other hand, interactive theorem proving such as the OTS/CafeOBJ method and Isabelle/UNITY can also be applied to infinite-state systems. Although abstraction methods [34] make a finite-state abstract version of a given (infinite-state) system and make it possible to model check the abstract version with respect to a given property, it is necessary to prove that the abstraction used preserves the property, which usually needs (interactive) theorem proving.
Conclusion
We have described a way to verify that designs for systems satisfy liveness properties in the OTS/CafeOBJ method. A mutual exclusion protocol called Qlock has been used as an example, and it has been verified that Qlock satisfies the lockout freedom property, which can be expressed as a leads-to property.
Proof scores of ensures properties are quite similar to ones of invariant properties [3] - [5] , and so are ones of unless and stable properties. This means that the verification techniques and tips [3] devised for verification of invariant properties can be used for verification of ensure properties.
In addition to the mutual exclusion protocol, we have applied the proposed verification method to a workflow system that takes into consideration some security policies [35] , [36] . We still need to apply the method to a wider variety of applications to demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed verification method.
